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Semantic cross-scale numerical anchoring
Adam J. L. Harris∗ Maarten Speekenbrink†
Abstract
Anchoring effects are robust, varied and can be consequential. Researchers have provided a variety of alternative explanations
for these effects. More recently, it has become apparent that anchoring effects might be produced by a variety of different
processes, either acting simultaneously, or else individually in distinct situations. An unresolved issue is whether anchoring,
aside from simple numeric priming, can transcend scales. That is, is it necessary that the anchor value and the target judgment
are expressed in the same units? Despite some theoretical predictions to the contrary, this paper demonstrates semantic
cross-scale anchoring in four experiments. Such effects are important for the direction of future theorising on the causes of
anchoring effects and understanding the scope of their consequences in applied domains.
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1 Semantic cross-scale numerical an-
choring
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) famously asked their par-
ticipants to estimate the percentage of African countries in
the United Nations. Before providing their estimate, par-
ticipants were asked whether the percentage was larger or
smaller than a number that was randomly produced by a
wheel of fortune. Participants for whom the wheel produced
a larger number estimated a higher percentage of African
countries in the United Nations than did those for whom
the wheel produced a smaller number. Tversky and Kah-
neman referred to this as an anchoring effect, which in this
instance is clearly irrational, for a random number produced
by a wheel of fortune should not influence one’s estimates.
Since Tversky and Kahneman’s seminal work, anchoring ef-
fects have been observed in many domains. In the applied
arena, these include the pricing of real estate by estate agents
(Northcraft & Neale, 1987), sentencing decisions of judges
(for a review see Englich, 2006), students’ evaluations of
course instructors (Thorsteinson, Breier, Atwell, Hamilton
& Privette, 2008), negotiations (Galinsky & Mussweiler,
2001; Schaerer, Swaab & Galinsky, 2015), supermarket pur-
chase decisions (Wansink, Kent & Hoch, 1998), and the
payment of credit card bills (Navarro-Martinez, Salisbury,
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Lemon, Stewart, Matthews & Harris, 2011; Stewart, 2009).
Despite the obvious implications of such effects, there is no
agreed unifying theory for the effects. If anything, debate
over the underlying psychological processes appears to be
intensifying, as additional theories are advanced (Frederick
& Mochon, 2012) and previous influential results revisited
(Simmons, LeBoeuf & Nelson, 2010).
Candidate accounts advanced to explain anchoring effects
have included anchoring-and-adjustment (Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1974), numeric priming (Wilson, Houston, Etling
& Brekke, 1996; Wong & Kwong, 2000), magnitude prim-
ing (Oppenheimer, LeBoeuf & Brewer, 2008; see Sleeth-
Keppler, 2013, for a related account), selective accessibility
(Mussweiler & Strack, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Strack
& Mussweiler, 1997; see Chapman & Johnson, 1999, for a
related account), and scale distortion (Frederick & Mochon,
2012; Mochon & Frederick, 2013).
Scale distortion is the most recent theory advanced to ex-
plain anchoring effects. An important feature of this account
is that it is the subjective perception of what values on the
response scale mean rather than the subjective impression
of the stimulus itself (stimulus distortion) that is altered (as
shown in Figure 1). Specifically, scale distortion suggests
that, after consideration of a small value (e.g., 5 lbs.), a con-
trast effect leads larger numbered values (e.g., 1000 lbs.) to
appear larger. Thus, the weight of an object that is objec-
tively 1000 lbs. is represented with a value less than this
(anchoring) because the perception of the numerical scale
has been altered. By contrast, selective accessibility is a
theory of stimulus distortion: Upon being asked whether an
object (objectively heavier than 5 lbs.) is heavier or lighter
than 5 lbs., confirmatory hypothesis testing results in se-
lective recruitment of information more consistent with the
object being lighter than it is. When subsequently asked how
heavy the object is, this information results in the impression
of a lighter object (e.g., Strack & Mussweiler, 1997).
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One source of evidence put forward in support of the scale
distortion account of anchoring was a failure to observe an-
choring effects where the scale unit of the anchor and the
scale unit of the target judgment differed (i.e., cross-scale
anchoring was not observed, Frederick & Mochon, 2012; a
negative result also observed in Chapman & Johnson, 1994).
The aim of the present investigation is to test whether cross-
scale anchoring effects can ever be obtained — outside of
low-level numeric andmagnitude priming effects (Critcher&
Gilovich, 2008 [but seeMatthews, 2011, for critique]; Muss-
weiler & Strack, 2001, Study 3; Oppenheimer et al., 2008;
Sleeth-Keppler, 2013; Wilson et al., 1996; Wong & Kwong,
2000), which are likely to be less long-lasting and resis-
tant to change than those resulting from semantic processes
(see e.g., Blankenship, Wegener, Petty, Detweiler-Bedell &
Macy, 2008).
In addition to Frederick and Mochon (2012), Harvey
(2011) proposes that anchoring effects might occur as an
overgeneralisation of a judgment strategy that is rational for
(typically autocorrelated) time series data. Potentially, he
suggests, “all that is necessary for two successive values to
be treated as part of the same data series is that they be
labelled as being on the same scale” (p. 106). Whilst an ob-
servation of cross-scale anchoring would not speak directly
to the detriment of any particular theory, it would be an im-
portant result to be aware of for future theory development
and refinement. Furthermore, the applied consequences of
anchoring are likely greater if cross-scale anchoring can be
observed: decisionmaking is typically dependent upon one’s
subjective impression of a stimulus, and not the label that one
happens to give that impression. Consequently, demonstra-
tions of cross-scale anchoring suggest a more consequential
effect than a failure to demonstrate such transfer.
Frederick and Mochon (2012) presented four studies in
which an anchoring effect was observed when the anchor
was presented on the same scale as the target judgment, but
was not observed when the anchor was presented on a dif-
ferent scale. A representative example of these studies was
that participants’ judgments of a giraffe’s weight in lbs. were
higher (than a control condition with no anchor) after esti-
mating the weight of a blue whale in lbs, but were unaffected
when estimating the weight of a blue whale in tons (Fred-
erick & Mochon, 2012, Study 3B). Such a task differs from
standard tasks in the anchoring literature, in which partici-
pants are asked to make a comparative judgment between the
anchor and the stimulus (e.g., “Is the proportion of African
countries greater or less than 80%?” –Tversky&Kahneman,
1974). Inclusion of such a question might lead to cross-scale
anchoring effects for one of (at least) two reasons:
1. The comparison question will trigger confirmatory hy-
pothesis testing, consequently leading to greater acces-
sibility of information consistent with the anchor value,
generating an anchoring effect via selective accessibil-
ity (e.g., Strack & Mussweiler, 1997).
2. The comparison question will lead participants to em-
ploy an approximate conversion between the scales,
which will allow scale distortion processes to oper-
ate. Mochon and Frederick (2013) demonstrate that
a comparative question is necessary for anchoring ef-
fects when the anchor stimulus and the target stimulus
are sufficiently different from one another. Even on the
scale distortion account, some comparison between the
anchor and target seems necessary, and when such a
comparison is not instigated by the nature of the anchor
and target themselves, a comparison question may be
required.
In the present paper, Experiment 1 allows for both these pro-
cesses to potentially operate, but either way demonstrates
the unique result of cross-scale anchoring (where a numeric
priming account predicts an opposite result). Experiments 2
and 3, however, make the second process difficult to envisage,
since they demonstrate anchoring that is both cross-scale and
cross-dimensional. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that an
estimate of weight (in lbs.) can bias an estimate of height (in
feet). It is difficult to envisage a straightforward conversion
between weight and height, as required for (2) above. Ex-
periment 4, finally, provides support for one consequence of
cross-scale anchoring: the failure of a straightforward inter-
vention to avoid anchoring effects of credit card minimum
payment information on credit card repayment decisions.
2 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was based on Frederick and Mochon (2012,
Study 3B), but included an additional manipulation of
whether or not a comparative question was asked.
2.1 Method
Participants 6 participants were initially removed from
the dataset for failing to follow experimental instructions
— providing a large range for their best estimate of the
giraffe’s weight, or they reported estimating the giraffe’s
weight in tons rather than lbs. 3 additional participants (in
line with departmental ethical guidelines) were excluded for
not reporting their age, or reporting that they were younger
than 18 years old. After these exclusions, there were 857
U.S-basedMechanical Turk workers who participated in this
experiment (319 female), aged 18–76 (median = 25).
Design, materials and procedure The experiment was
run online through http://www.qualtrics.com. There were
5 (between-participant) experimental conditions. A control
condition simply required participants to estimate the weight
of an adult male giraffe in lbs. In the ‘lbs-no comparison’
condition, participants estimated the weight of an adult male
African elephant in lbs. before estimating the weight of an
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Figure 1: A stimulus and scale distortion based account of the effect of a low anchor on estimates of a giraffe’s weight.
Adapted from “A scale distortion theory of anchoring,” by S. W. Frederick and D. Mochon, 2012, Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 141, p. 125. Copyright 2011 by the American Psychological Association.
Control (no anchor)
With no anchor, people form an internal representation of the gi-
raffe’s size (represented by the top row) which they map onto an overt
response on the scale (pounds).
Stimulus Distortion
A low anchor results in a smaller internal representation of the
size of a giraffe, leading to a smaller numerical estimate of its weight.
Scale Distortion
A low anchor results in large numbers on the scale feeling larger,
which consequently then correspond to larger exemplars (shifting
the mapping from the original greyed out scale, to the distorted one
below). This distortion implies that a smaller number is sufficient to
communicate the (unchanged) internal representation of the giraffe’s size.
adult male giraffe in lbs. The ‘tons-no comparison’ con-
dition was the same, except that participants estimated the
elephant’s weight in tons. The lbs-comparison condition
and the tons-comparison condition replicated the latter two
conditions, but also required participants to indicate, after
estimating the weight of an elephant and before estimating
the weight of a giraffe, whether a giraffe weighs more or less
than an elephant. The dependent variable was the estimate
of the giraffe’s weight (lbs.).
All participants subsequently provided their age and gen-
der.
2.2 Results and Discussion
Data preparation Before further analysis, 11 additional
participants were excluded for estimating the giraffe’s weight
as less than 10 lbs. All these participants were in a condition
that had first estimated the weight of an elephant in tons.
Given that 4 participants in this condition had explicitly re-
ported misreading the question and providing an estimate in
tons, it was assumed that these participants had made the
same mistake. One participant (from the lbs-comparison
condition, where higher estimates were predicted) was ex-
cluded for estimating the giraffe’s weight at 1 million lbs.
(as well as an estimate of the elephant’s weight of 200 mil-
lion lbs.(!)).Following these initial exclusions, the mean and
standard deviation of the data were calculated, and partic-
ipants whose estimates of the giraffe’s weight were more
than 3 standard deviations from the mean were excluded (the
cut-off for inclusion was an estimate that was less than 10,
621 lbs.). This excluded 10 further participants (3 estimated
12,000 lbs.; 1 estimated 14,500 lbs.; 3 estimated 15,000 lbs.;
and estimates of 16,000; 20,000 and 70,000 lbs.).
835 participants (308 female) were thus retained for anal-
ysis, with an age range of 18 to 76 years (median = 25).
Remaining participants were fairly evenly distributed across
conditions, with between 161 and 171 in each condition.
Analyses without these exclusions are presented in the sup-
plementary materials, and any analysis for which an exclu-
sion alters the pattern of significance is noted with a footnote
below.
Analysis Because responses were positively skewed, all
responses were log transformed for inferential analyses, al-
though for clarity we report the non-transformed descriptive
statistics (all patterns of significance were the same when
non-transformed data were analysed). We initially followed
Frederick and Mochon (2012), comparing each of the ex-
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perimental groups with the control condition. The mean
estimate of the giraffe’s weight in the control condition was
1131 lbs. (SE = 72). We replicated Frederick and Mochon’s
results, observing an anchoring effect in the ‘lbs-no compar-
ison’ condition (mean = 1488, SE = 115, t(337) = 3.15,
p = .002, Cohen’s d = 0.34), and no anchoring effect in
the ‘tons-no comparison’ condition (mean = 1065, SE = 66,
t(330) = 0.32, p = .75, d = −.03).
In the comparison conditions, 327/335 participants an-
swered the comparison question as predicted (elephant heav-
ier than giraffe), confirming that an elephant’s weight is a
high anchor for a giraffe’s weight. The critical analysis of es-
timates of a giraffe’sweight concerned the ‘tons-comparison’
condition. Here, a significant (cross-scale) anchoring effect
was observed (mean = 1588, SE = 113, t(335) = 3.59,
p < .001, d = 0.39).1 A numerical priming explanation
would predict the opposite result, since the median esti-
mate of the elephant’s weight in tons was 3 tons (a small
numeric anchor).2 Moreover, a magnitude priming explana-
tion would not predict the lack of an effect with the absence
of a comparative question. To complete the pairwise tests
with the control condition, the ’lbs-comparison’ condition
was compared with the control group, and again a signifi-
cant anchoring effect was observed (mean = 1593, SE = 105,
t(338) = 4.17, p < .001, d = 0.45). The complete descrip-
tive statistics are shown in Figure 2, and a table summarising
the anchoring effects observed across all experiments can be
found in the Appendix.
In terms of comparing the results of the experimental
conditions with the control group, the data were in line with
experimental predictions. To better ascertain the relative
contributions of scale consistency and the comparison ques-
tion, a 2x2 ANOVA was conducted between the 4 experi-
mental conditions. All 3 effects were significant in this anal-
ysis. The strongest effect was a main effect of comparison
question, such that higher estimates (i.e., a stronger anchor-
ing effect) were observed in the presence of the comparison
question than in its absence (see Figure 2, F (1, 660) = 12.65,
p < .001, MSE = 0.11, η2p = .019). There was also a main
effect of scale, such that a stronger anchoring effect was
observed when the anchor was on the same scale as the
target judgment (i.e., lbs.) (F (1, 660) = 7.36, p = .007,
MSE = 0.11, η2p = .011), and an interaction between the
variables, (F (1, 660) = 4.33, p = .038, MSE = 0.11,
η
2
p = .007).3 Simple effects tests confirmed what is sug-
1This result is dependent on excluding five participants with estimates
of the giraffe’s weight of less than 10 lbs. This exclusion is justified above,
and further justified in the supplementary materials, where a histogram
demonstrates the degree to which these responses were outliers.
2The mean was 130, suggesting that some participants had misread the
question and reported their estimates in lbs. Removing these participants
(either estimates of the elephant’s weight ≥ 50 ’tons’ or ≥ 10 ’tons’) did
not affect the results.
3The interaction term was not significant in an analysis without exclu-
sions (see supplementary materials).
Figure 2: Estimates of the giraffe’s weight (lbs.) across
all conditions of Experiment 1. The control group did not
judge an anchor, but is included for comparison. Error bars
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gested in Figure 2. The scale onwhich the anchor was judged
had an effect onlywhen no comparisonwas required between
the anchor and the target, (F (1, 660) = 11.42, p < .001,
MSE = 0.11; other F < 1). The presence of a comparison
question had a significant effect only when the anchor was
judged in tons, (F (1, 660) = 15.69, p < .001, MSE = 0.11;
for lbs.: F[1, 660] = 1.11, p = .29, MSE = 0.11).
Thus, when participants are required to make a compari-
son between the anchor and the target, it makes no difference
whether they estimate the size of the anchor using the same
scale as the target or a different one, the size of the anchoring
effect is indistinguishable (see Figure 2). As mentioned in
the Introduction, the cross-scale anchoring effect observed
in this experiment could have arisen as a result of partici-
pants distorting the lbs. scale after first having translated the
judgement of the whale onto this scale (e.g., by multiplying
the number of tons by 2000). Regardless, the present experi-
ment still demonstrates that cross-scale anchoring effects can
occur. However, it is an open question as to whether such
effects can occur when such a translation is not feasible, for
instance when the judgments about the anchor and target
are about different dimensions, not just on different scales.
Experiment 2 was designed to answer this question.
3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 is based on Frederick and Mochon’s (2012)
Study 4 and tests whether cross-dimensional anchoring (es-
timates of a giraffe’s height being lower having first judged
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a wolf’s weight) can be observed once a comparative ques-
tion is included. On the selective accessibility account, the
introduction of the comparison question means that when
determining whether a giraffe weighs more or less than a
wolf, participants will engage in a search for information
about a giraffe consistent with it weighing the same as a wolf
(Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). Hence, when they come to
estimate the giraffe’s height, their representation of a giraffe
is smaller and so an anchoring effect could be observed. It
is useful to note that early support for the selective accessi-
bility theory of anchoring (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) was
obtained from an observation that judgments of the height
of the Brandenburg Gate did not influence estimates of the
width of the Brandenburg Gate (though Frederick & Mo-
chon, 2012 and Mochon & Frederick, 2013, observed such
cross-dimensional transfer when estimates used the same
scale in an experiment with increased power). Here, we pur-
port that selective accessibility could predict an influence of
weight on height judgments (which are, by necessity, pre-
sented on different scales) because the height and weight of
animals tend to be correlated in the real world. Whilst Ex-
periment 1 employed a high anchor, Experiment 2 employed
a low anchor.
3.1 Method
Participants 325 U.S. participants (107 female) aged 18–
69 (median = 26) were recruited via Amazon Mechanical
Turk.
Design, materials and procedure Participants were ran-
domly assigned to 1 of 2 experimental conditions. All par-
ticipants estimated the height of an adult giraffe in feet. Par-
ticipants in the anchor condition first judged the weight of
an adult wolf in lbs., then indicated whether an adult giraffe
weighs more or less than an adult wolf, before judging the
height of a giraffe.
All other aspects of the procedure were the same as in
Experiment 1.
3.2 Results and Discussion
2 participants were excluded from the analysis because their
estimates of the giraffe’s height were more than 3 standard
deviations above the mean (120 and 300 feet — the ‘cut-
off’ was 77 feet). An additional participant was excluded
for reporting the impossible result of a giraffe’s height being
zero. In the anchor condition, 160/164 participants answered
the comparison question as predicted (giraffe heavier than
wolf), confirming that a wolf’s weight is a low anchor for a
giraffe’s weight.
Because responses were positively skewed, all responses
were log transformed for inferential analyses, although we
report the non-transformed descriptive statistics (all patterns
of significance were the same when non-transformed data
were analysed). An anchoring effect was observed in this
experiment. Estimates of the giraffe’s height were lower
in the anchor condition (mean = 16.46; SE = 0.60) than
the control condition (mean = 19.84; SE = 0.82, t(320) =
3.89, p < .001, d = 0.43). Thus, once the comparative
question was included, an anchoring effect was observed on
estimates of a giraffe’s height when the anchor concerned
the semantically related property of weight. Once again, a
numerical priming explanation would predict the opposite
result, since the median estimate of the wolf’s weight was a
high absolute number (100 lbs — the mean was 115 lbs).
Experiment 3 sought to replicate this key result, but in-
cluded information stating that the anchor was randomly
generated. Such instructions are common in anchoring re-
search and designed to highlight the sub-optimality of the
anchoring effect, as results cannot be interpreted as partici-
pants perceiving the anchor as an informative conversational
‘environmental suggestion’ (Epley & Gilovich, 2010).
4 Experiment 3
4.1 Method
Participants 482 U.S. participants (153 female; 1 partici-
pant did not answer this question) aged 18–70 (median = 26)
were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Design, materials and procedure Participants were ran-
domly assigned to 1 of 3 experimental conditions. All par-
ticipants estimated the height of an adult giraffe in feet. Par-
ticipants in the anchor conditions were instructed to start
and then stop a ‘random number generator’ (four very fast
spinning wheels). In the low anchor condition, these reels
stopped at a number between 0101 and 0129 (the mean esti-
mate of a wolf’s weight in Experiment 2 was 113 lbs.). This
value was lower than the 5th percentile of giraffe weight es-
timates in the control condition of Experiment 1 (300 lbs.).
The 95th percentile of giraffe weight estimates in the control
condition of Experiment 1 was 3380 lbs. We therefore chose
a high anchor that was higher than this value and so, in the
high anchor condition, the reels displayed a number between
4001 and 4029. In both conditions, the absolute value of
the number would provide a high anchor for the height of
a giraffe on a numeric priming account. These participants
were subsequently asked whether a giraffe weighed more or
less than this number of lbs., and subsequently estimated the
height of a giraffe in feet.
All other aspects of the procedure were the same as in
Experiment 1.
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4.2 Results and Discussion
9 participants were excluded from the analysis because their
estimates of the giraffe’s height were more than 3 standard
deviations above the mean (the cut-off was 40 feet). In
the comparison questions, 133/146 reported that a giraffe’s
weight is less than the high anchor, whilst 144/151 reported
that a giraffe’s weight is more than the low anchor (χ2(1) =
222.7, p < .001), confirming the status of the high and low
anchors.
Because responses were positively skewed, all responses
were log transformed for inferential analyses, although we
report the non-transformed descriptive statistics (unless oth-
erwise noted, patterns of significance were the same when
non-transformed data were analysed). A significant effect of
anchor condition on participants’ estimates of giraffe height
was observed (F (2, 470) = 3.50, MSE = 0.021, p = .031,
η
2
p = .015). Planned pairwise comparisons demonstrated
that estimates in the low anchor condition (mean = 15.30;
SE = 0.41) were lower than in the control condition (mean
= 17.05; SE = 0.47, t(325) = 2.48, p = .014, d = 0.28).
Estimates in the high anchor condition (mean = 15.69;
SE = 0.43) did not significantly differ from estimates in
the control condition (t(320) = 1.83, p = .067, d = −0.21).
Unexpectedly, estimates in the high anchor condition were
(directionally) lower than those in the control condition.4
Experiment 3 therefore replicated the cross-dimensional
effect of a low anchor observed in Experiment 2, in a setup
in which the potential influence of environmental suggestion
was controlled. Despite the significant result in the overall
ANOVA, the support for cross-scale, cross-dimensional an-
choring in this experiment is tempered by the fact that only
the low-anchor and control conditions differed from one an-
other. The two anchor conditions did not differ from each
other, t(295) < 1. The (directional) contrast effect with
the high anchor was not predicted. The selective accessibil-
ity account has, however, been advanced to predict contrast
effects where extreme anchors are used (see Strack & Muss-
weiler, 1997), so it is possible that the high anchor we used
was too extreme in this case. 9% of participants did not,
however, appear to view the high anchor as a high anchor
(from their responses to the comparative question), whilst
only 5% failed to view the low anchor as a low anchor on the
same metric. If, however, one considers the distance from
themedian value of a giraffe’s weight in the control condition
of Experiment 1 (800 lbs.), the high anchor (approx. 4000)
appears somewhat more extreme than the low anchor (ap-
prox. 100). Whilst Experiment 3 provides some support for
cross-scale, cross-dimensional anchoring, the lack of pre-
4This result attained significance in the non-transformed data (t (320) =
2.09, p = .037, d = −0.24).
dicted effects between certain cells might provide fruitful
investigation for future research.
5 Experiment 4
As mentioned in the Introduction, the observation of cross-
scale anchoring suggests a greater applied importance of
anchoring than implied by scale distortion. Moreover, it
is a consequential result for policy makers seeking to min-
imise potential harmful effects of anchors. There have been
numerous demonstrations of potentially consequential an-
choring effects in applied situations. One potentially costly
example is in the context of credit card repayments. Both
British (Stewart, 2009) and American (Navarro-Martinez et
al., 2011) credit card holders reported they would repay less
of their bill in a condition where a minimum payment was
provided than in one where the minimum payment informa-
tion was absent. In Stewart’s experiment, mean repayments
decreased from 40% to 23% of the overall balance when
minimum payment information was included.5 For a typical
consumer, with a bill of $4,000 and an annual percentage rate
of interest of 20%, such an effect corresponds to a two-fold
increase in interest payments from $49 to $109 (Stewart,
2009). The elimination of such an effect would therefore
convey considerable economic benefit to consumers. Were
cross-scale anchoring to never occur, the beneficial effects of
low anchors (ensuring that no debtors default on a monthly
payment) could be maintained, without the undesirable an-
choring effect, simply by providing the anchor on a different
scale.
The results reported in Experiments 1–3 suggest that an-
choring would not be eliminated by providing the minimum
payment in a different scale (percentage of balance) to the
payment requested ($). Experiment 4 provided a direct test
of this, and consequently a further test of cross-scale anchor-
ing.
5.1 Method
Participants After excluding 2 participants who did not
report an age greater than 18 years, 604 (215 female) U.S.
based Mechanical Turk workers aged between 18 and 75
(median = 26) were retained for analysis. 332 reported hav-
ing paid off a credit card bill ‘virtually every month’ in the
course of the past year, whilst 132 reported never having
paid off a credit card bill in the course of the past year. 136
participants reported paying off a credit card bill between 1
and 10 times in the past year (4 did not answer this question).
5These figures result from an analysis of those who did not pay the
full amount owed. The proportion of people paying the full amount was
unaffected by the presence or absence of minimum payment information.
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Figure 3: A screenshot of the credit card bill and response
question presented to participants in the ‘minimum payment
percentage’ condition.
Design Participants were presented with a mock credit
card statement showing a total balance of $1937.28 (as in
Navarro-Martinez et al., 2011). They were instructed to
imagine that they had just received this credit card state-
ment, and were to think about the money they currently had
and the amount they could afford to pay before making a
decision as to how much of the credit card bill to repay.
Below the instructions, the credit card bill was presented
(Figure 3). The total amount due was always shown. Partici-
pants were assigned to one of three experimental conditions.
In the ‘no minimum’ group, there was no mention of a min-
imum payment. In the ‘minimum $’ group, the “minimum
payment amount” was $38.74 (2% of the balance). In the
‘minimum %’ group, the “minimum payment percentage”
was 2%. Participants reported the amount they would repay
in dollars. In all three conditions, if participants entered an
amount that was less than $38.74, they were presented with
an error warning stating “You must pay at least $38.74”.
Thus, the minimum payment required in all conditions was
the same, but this information was differentially available to
participants before they attempted to submit their response.
Materials and procedure The experiment was pro-
grammed in html and JavaScript and run via Amazon Me-
chanical Turk. Having provided their responses to the re-
payment question, on the next screen participants provided
demographic information pertaining to their age and gender
as well as asking them how many times in the past year they
had paid a credit card bill (Never; 1–3 times; 4–6 times; 7–
10 times; Virtually every month). Finally, to guard against
computer ‘robots’ completing the experiment, participants
typed out a 4-digit number shown in a photograph.6
Table 1: Percentage of participants repaying the full debt on
their credit card statement in Experiment 1.




5.2 Results and Discussion
6 participants were excluded whose repayments either con-
tained inappropriate characters, or were greater than the bal-
ance of $1937.28. After these exclusions, 209 participants
were in the ‘no minimum’ condition, 193 in the ‘minimum
$’ condition and 196 in the ‘minimum % condition.’ Ta-
ble 1 shows the number of participants repaying the full
amount ($1937.28) in each condition. Although more par-
ticipants paid the full amount in the ‘Nominimum’ condition,
an overall chi-squared contingency test was not significant
(χ2(2) = 3.39, p = .18).
Following Stewart (2009), when participants made partial
repayments (i.e., excluding full repayers), the amount of re-
payment made in each condition yielded the same anchoring
effect reported in Stewart (2009) and Navarro-Martinez et
al. (2011). Participants paid off more in the ‘No minimum’
condition (mean = 339.69; median = 200, Interquartile range
[IQR] = $400), than the ‘Minimum $’ condition (mean =
$220.62; median = $93.64, IQR = $156.25, Mann-Whitney
U = 8115.0, p < .001).7 Of more interest, the anchoring ef-
fect was also observed in the ‘Minimum%’ condition (mean
= $232.24; median = $150, IQR = $240, U = 10360.5,
p = .009). Finally, partial repayments in the ‘Minimum %’
condition were significantly higher than those in the ‘Min-
imum $’ condition (U = 10022.0, p = .002). The pattern
of results remains the same if those participants who did
not report paying off a credit card bill in the last year are
excluded.
Thus, although the cross-scale anchoring effect was
smaller than the same-scale anchoring effect, mean repay-
ments of people not paying off the full amount were still
smaller in the ‘Minimum %’ condition than in the condition
without a minimum payment, demonstrating cross-scale an-
choring.
64 further participants would have been excluded based on incorrectly
typing out this number. In the end, we decided against using this as an
exclusion criterion on the advice of the editor who indicated that a single
question constitutes a rather insensitive attention check, which will result in
both misses and false positives.
7Repayments were highly skewed and log transformation did not result
in a normal distribution, so we follow Stewart (2009a) in performing non-
parametric inferential statistics. The patterns of significance are the same
if parametric statistics are undertaken on log transformed responses.
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6 General Discussion
Across three experiments, we observed consistent evidence
for semantic cross-scale numerical anchoring. In a final ex-
periment investigating hypothetical credit card repayments,
we demonstrated a cross-scale anchoring effect of minimum
payment information, further demonstrating the applied im-
portance of this result. Experiments 2 and 3 went somewhat
further than Experiments 1 and 4 in demonstrating cross-
scale, cross-dimensional anchoring.
We argued that there was no potential for scale distortion
processes to operate in Experiments 2 and 3, since there is
no direct translation of height (in feet) into weight (in lbs.).
In response, a proponent of scale distortion could argue that
the correlated nature of height and weight means that one
can provide a reasonable estimate of height once one has an
estimate of weight – consequently, although there is not a
straightforward translation between feet and lbs., a ‘reason-
able’ conversion could be made. A subsequent anchoring ef-
fect could then be attributed to scale distortion.8 Whilst such
an account is possible, and indeed could be induced by the
experimental pragmatics associated with the experimenter
asking participants to first consider the giraffe’s weight, it
seems unlikely to us. Moreover, the correlation between
height and weight is inherently a feature of the stimuli (an-
imals), not one inherent in the scale. The inferential steps
involved in first translating and then distorting the scale of
the target judgment are thus much more involved than a sim-
ple scale distortion account would assume. We believe an
account in terms of stimulus distortion is both more parsi-
monious and more likely.
In addition to demonstrating the applied importance of
cross-scale anchoring, Experiment 4 demonstrated cross-
scale anchoring in the absence of a comparative question.
We posit that, in contrast to the majority of laboratory an-
choring studies that highlight the randomness of an anchor
value (e.g., the present Experiment 3), in this real-world sit-
uation, in which the minimum payment is clearly not entirely
irrelevant to the decision at hand, it is this relevance which
facilitates a cross-scale anchoring effect. Whether this is due
to an anchoring-and-adjustment process, an implicit compar-
ison giving rise to selective accessibility processes, or even
a conversion of the percentage into a dollar amount, which
is then susceptible to scale distortion processes, is a question
for future research. The result, however, is clear. Presenting
the minimum payment on a different scale does not eliminate
the anchoring effect on payment amounts, although it does
attenuate it (and could consequently be of economic benefit
to consumers). That the cross-scale anchoring effect seems
not always to require a comparison question (see also Oppen-
heimer et al., 2008, who observed ‘magnitude priming’ in the
absence of a comparison question), is perhaps beneficial in
8We thank Shane Frederick for this suggestion made in the course of the
reviewing process.
reconciling the current result with seemingly contradictory
findings reported in Mochon and Frederick (2013). Mochon
and Frederick reported evidence that a comparative question
was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for anchor-
ing effects to occur. By contrast, an explicit numerical value
on a consistent scale was a necessary condition. Having ob-
served cross-scale anchoring without a comparison question
in Experiment 4, the result we now turn attention to concerns
the necessity of a consistent scale.
In the critical conditions (for the present discussion) of
Mochon and Frederick’s (2013) Study 1, participants were
asked whether a camera costs more or less than either: $6,
$900, ‘a pack ofAAbatteries’ or ‘awashingmachine’, before
estimating the price of a camera. Based on the current re-
sults, one might predict that comparing a camera to a pack of
batteries would lead to lower estimates of the camera’s price
than comparing it to a washing machine. Mechanism ‘1’
in the Introduction, for example, would predict that compar-
ing a camera to a pack of batteries would prime information
consistent with a cheap camera, which would then result in
lower estimates of the camera’s price. There was, however,
no significant difference in estimates between the ‘batter-
ies’ (mean = $158) and ‘washing machine’ (mean = $189)
conditions. Where the anchor was an explicit value ($6 vs.
$900), however, estimates of the camera’s price were higher
following the high anchor (mean = $376) than the low anchor
(mean = $164).
Estimates following the ‘$6’ anchor were no lower than
those following the ‘batteries’ anchor. The result that an-
choring is observed with explicit numerical anchors (on the
same scale) and not implied values (the LGwashingmachine
and AA batteries had objective retail prices of approximately
$900 and $6) is driven by the increased estimate following
the explicit $900 anchor, which was not observed for the
washing machine.
Explanation ‘1’ in the Introduction is based on the se-
lective accessibility account of anchoring (e.g., Strack &
Mussweiler, 1997). According to this account, when asked
whether a camera costs more or less than a washing ma-
chine, participants will seek for evidence consistent with
the hypothesis that these are the same price. Note that this
evidence could come from thinking about more expensive
cameras, but it could also come from thinking about cheaper
washingmachines. If perceptions of washingmachine prices
are more uncertain than perceptions of camera prices (and
note that this seems plausible, as larger prices are typically
less discriminable than smaller prices [e.g., Lambert, 1978]),
the perception of the washing machine is likely to be shifted
more than the perception of the camera – theories of infor-
mation aggregation predict that when combining two values
(estimates for example), the resulting posterior judgmentwill
be closer to the value with the lower variance (read ‘uncer-
tainty’; for direct application of such theories to anchoring,
see Turner & Schley, 2016). Consequently, any anchoring
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effect on the price of the camera will be attenuated. In
the present experiments, such an effect is less likely as par-
ticipants are first asked to report the value for the anchor,
potentially ‘locking in’ a specific exemplar for future com-
parisons, meaning that future comparisons are more likely
to influence perceptions of the target object than the ‘locked
in’ anchor.
The above explanation is but one possibility andwe should
highlight the speculative nature of it. Nonetheless, we sug-
gest that an investigation of the effect of the uncertainty
of the anchor value on cross-scale anchoring effects would
be a worthwhile endeavour for future research. Note that
this question has not arisen previously in anchoring research
since anchors are typically precise numerical values, with no
associated uncertainty. By contrast, one’s perception of the
value of an LG washing machine is likely to be associated
with a degree of uncertainty. Thus, we propose (tentatively)
that uncertainty of the anchor value might be one bound-
ary condition for anchoring effects on a target judgment (a
similar argument might be relevant to Chapman & Johnson,
1994, Experiment 2).
Our attempts to explain the different results obtained in
the current experiments and inMochon and Frederick (2013)
seem, to us, to be in line with Mochon and Frederick’s own
theorising. Different anchoring effects might exert differen-
tial influence across different situations (or internal charac-
teristics of the individual – Blankenship et al., 2008; We-
gener, Petty, Blankenship & Detweiler-Bedell, 2010). Iden-
tifying those different situations is an important goal of future
research, especially given a move towards more integrative
theories of anchoring (in addition to the citations immedi-
ately above, see also, Chaxel, 2014; Simmons, LeBoeuf &
Nelson, 2010). The potential explanations proferred here are
not exhaustive, and arbitrating between competing accounts
in behavioral experiments is clearly a far from straightfor-
ward challenge for future research. The current research
does demonstrate, however, that such future research and
theorising must entertain the reality of cross-scale numer-
ical anchoring effects transcending mere numeric priming
effects.
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